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Introduction 
Livestock production (beef, milk, broilers and eggs) constitutes an 
important food resource for the population of The Dominican Republic; in fact, 
this country is a net exporter of beef, self sufficient in eggs but a deficit 
producer of milk. Domestic demand for milk has been increasing rapidly during 
the past years (4 percent annually) due to an average annual population 
increase of 2.9 percent, a high positive income elasticity of demand at low 
Dominican income levels and increasing real incomes. Domestic milk production 
has failed to keep pace with the domestic demand, and because of this im-
balance the imports of milk have increased (Table 1). 
The use of increasingly limited foreign exchange to import milk came 
under heavy questioning in the mid-1970s because of 1) the post-1974 weakening 
of world prices for sugar, a crop which traditionally has accounted for about 
SO percent of The Dominican foreign exchange earnings, and (2)the continuing 
rapid rise in petroleum import costs. 
Input prices have become a disincentive for producers in recent years. 
In 1970, the price of feed concentrates for animals was RD$3.38 per hundred 
*Former graduate student and Professor, respectively, Department of Agri-
cultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, 
Ohio, March, 1985. 
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pounds. One wheat quintal of 11Afrechop11 l was RD$2.25 and a common fer-
tilizer was RD$57 per ton. In 1979 these inputs were sold at RD$6.25, $3.00 
and $68, respectively. Moreover, electricity rates increased 60 percent 
during the same period • These input increases without any accompanying 
increases in producer prices have forced production costs up and obviously 
caused profits to decline. In 1982, a vociferous majority of dairy spokesmen 
defined the two main issues of the dairy industry as low returns and lack of 
incentives that might promote new livestock farms or increase the pro-
ductivity of the existing farm. 
Current information on imports of powdered milk and processed milk 
products is very limited. The SEA estimated that during the early 1970s 
approximately 20 to 25 percent of total milk consumed was imported. The value 
of dairy imports in 1977 was US$1.56 million and consisted largely of 3.2 
million kilograms of powdered milk. In 1980, INESPRE imported US$1.2 million 
of dairy products. Trends for the remainder of the decade indicate that at 
least 20 percent of the total milk consumed in Dominican Republic will be 
imported. Import targets for milk are based upon expectations of domestic 
supplies. However, the level of these imports has depended upon the im-
portance of different policymaker's objectives. For example, a low level of 
planned imports which could save foreign exchange has been the goal of several 
administrations. Nevertheless, imports still have not been displaced by an 
increase in domestic milk production. 
The government has designed an agricultural price policy which seeks to 
stimulate the production of domestically consumed food crops in addition to 
the more traditional goal of stabilizing prices. To implement this policy a 
This is the main concentrate used to feed livestock in the Dominican Republic. 
... 
' 
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specialized institution (Jnstituto de Estabilizacion de Precios - INESPRE) has 
responsibility for producer and consumer protection in the production and 
marketing of primary goods. 
INESPRE controls retail milk prices and has kept them low in recent 
years, ostensibly to protect low income families. However, the price controls 
have had a harmful effect on milk production. Many producers have abandoned 
dairy farming because it is not profitable and others claim that the un-
favorable price-cost ratios have not allowed them to invest in productiv-
ity-increasing inputs. As a result of lobbying efforts by milk producers, 
INESPRE in late 1970 announced a 30 percent increase in the retail milk price. 
It also took two additional steps aimed at benefitting low income consumers 
and at reducing the production depressing effects of continued imports of 
powdered milk which were being dumped by exporting countries at less than 
their cost of production. The first step was to make available at con-
cessionary prices to low income consumers a low fat blend of fresh and 
reconstituted milk. The second step was to place the importation of powdered 
milk under the control of INESPRE, which was directed to coordinate the 
imports with its overall programs of marketing and price control. 
Milk production is also affected by distortions in relative prices due 
to the over-valuation of the Dominican Peso, officially US 1.00 =RD 1.00, 
while in the "black market" a rate of US$1. 00 "" RD 1. 5 7 in 1983 implied an 
exchange rate over-valuation of 57 percent or more. The exchange rate 
over-valuation constitutes an implicit income transfer from one group to 
another in the whole society. There is an implicit subsidy on imports because 
the monetary board determines which imports can enter the country at the 
offici.al rate. Higher milk prices might be preferable to imports of powdered 
milk that are subsidized through an over-valued official exchange rate. 
- 4 -
Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to identify and measure the major 
economic incentives and disincentives resulting from policies affecting the 
Dominican dairy industry. 
Research studies on the elements affecting livestock production in the 
Dominican Republic have recently focused on economic aspects. animal health, 
labor, etc. Most of these studies, however, did not consider the effect of 
price control policy in agriculture as a factor discouraging production and 
subsidizing consumption. Quezada in 1981 analyzed the economic policies that 
have affected the rural sector of the Dominican Republic. Although Quezada 
concluded that there are many distortions caused by price policy and explored 
the implications of market intervention policies in agriculture, he did not 
try to quantify the effect of these policies on the price system. Furthermore, 
Quezada did not include the dairy industry in his study.2 
Analytical Framework 
Price intervention is widely used in developing countries.Governments use 
market intervention as a way to achieve desired consequences in terms of 
economic efficiency. Based on the principle that the price system should 
serve national goals, many countries have used various systems of subsidies 
and taxes to intervene in markets over the years. Market distortions arising 
from this intervention, however, are not easy to identify and measure. The 
main difficulty is that market intervention policies often occur under 
constraints of many pre-existing distortions. In all cases they affect the 
pricing system and the first logical step of any attempt at designing new 
market price policies is measuring the net effect of current policies. 
2 Quezada's econometric model analyzed the price intervention for six 
commodities: corn, rice, beans, peanuts, wheat and sugar cane. 
- 5 -
Given this, it is surprising that little attention has been paid to 
researching the effects of administered agricultural prices, taxes and 
subsidies on the pattern of production and consumption. In this analysis, it 
is assumed that there is one good (milk and its subproducts) for local 
consumption. Milk producers, however, receive for their product a price well 
below its opportunity {border) value.3 
Different measures will be utilized to quantify the effects of market 
distortions on the dairy industry. Four basic coefficients will be estimated. 
The Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), the Effective Protection Coefficient 
(EPC), the Domestic Resource Costs {DRC) and the Comparative Advantage 
Coefficien~ (CV).4 
International border prices will be used as a point of reference for the 
NPC and the EPC due to the fact that in small countries, like the Dominican 
Republic, border prices represent the true opportunity costs of the country's 
trade. Also, border prices reflect distortions between existing prices and 
the opportunity cost determined by international trade. 
Nominal Protection Coefficient 
The Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) of any commodity measures the 
distortions between the price of the product actually received by producers 
(pd) and the border price for the same product (pb). 
3 
4 
NPC. = ]_ (l) 
The concept of border price expresses the price of the item considered in 
terms of its international value. For an importing country (case of the 
Dominican Republic for milk) the border price used is the CIF price of 
bringing milk to the point of entrance into the country (31, p. 33). 
These measures have also been used by others in six country case studies 
(Argentina, Egypt, Kenya, Pakistan, Thailand and Yugoslavia) of prices, 
taxes and subsidies which formed part of a wider World Bank research 
project that commenced in late 1971. 
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The attractiveness of the NPC measure is based on three main factors: 
(1) the simplicity of the approach, 2) the intuitive interpretation of the 
distortion measures as equivalent tariffs, and 3) the relationship between 
these measures and the opportunity cost of foreign exchange ("the shadow 
exchange rate") equivalent and the opportunity cost of foreign exchange deter-
mined by the exchange rate. NPC's larger than one (> 1) indicate protection 
to the product. The amount of protection is equivalent to the NPC values 
minus one. NPC values less than one (< 1) indicates that the product has been 
taxed. The tax is equivalent to one minus the value of the coefficient. 
Effective Protection Coefficient 
The Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) measures the net effect of 
protective measures not only on traded outputs but also on traded inputs or, 
to put it in another way, on the value added. It provides a more complete 
estimate of the impact of market distortions on the incentives offered to 
producers of the product relative to those in the rest of the economy. 
Since discrepancies between domestic and international prices occur on 
traded inputs for final as well as intermediate goods, values added per output 
unit rather than prices, are used to compute EPC. The general formula is: 
value added in commodity at domestic price 
EPC = 
value added in commodity at border price 
This ratio can also be put in percentage form: 
Vad Vab 
x 100 EPC • 
Vab 
(2) 
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where: 
vad = value added per unit of output at domestic price 
-------·--
vab = value added per unit of output at border price 
Value added is obtained, in both cases, by subtracting the input value 
used in the production process from the price of the product at domestic and 
then at border prices. 
The interpretation of EPC is straightforward: 
EPC > I Means that, at the existing official exchange rate, protection 
measures provide a positive incentive to produce the commodity or 
carry out the activity under consideration. In other words, it 
indicates that the activity has been protected. 
EPC < I Indicates that protective measures discriminate against the commodity 
in question. In fact, the non-tradable production factors have 
received a payment below what they would receive in the absence of 
government intervention. 
EPC < 0 Signifies an absolute loss of foreign exchange to the economy. 
Domestic Resource Cost 
The DRC is obtained by computing the cost of foreign exchange earned 
for exports. Traded final goods are eval~ated at border prices. Non-traded 
goods are decomposed into traded inputs and non-traded primary factors 
(domestic resources). DRC's are then computed as the ratio between the cost of 
domestic resources (evaluated at accounting prices) and net foreign exchange 
earnings (value of traded output minus value of traded inputs). 
The DRC can be interpreted as a ratio between the cost of a dollar 
earned or saved through domestic production and an accounting rate of 
exchange: 
where 
DRC = 
J 
I: ai MPP y P b J y 
J = K+l i 
k 
p b - I: ( ai i J=l j 
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(3) 
ai· =quantity of jth input used to produce one unit of 
.] 
the ith output. 
MPPjy = marginal physical product of jth factor in its best 
alternative use (Y). 
pyb = border price of Y. 
j = 1,2 ... K inputs of directly traded goods plus the 
traded elements of non-traded goods after decom-
position. 
j = K+l ... j =inputs of primary, non-traded factors 
include those obtained as a result of decomposi-
tion of nontraded goods. 
pib = border price of the output/input for the ith commodity 
of jth input. 
p.b = foreign price of the jth input. J 
According to the creators of the DRC measure, the cost of foreign 
exchange criterion "clearly measures comparative advantage" at the core of 
this criterion. However, there are two basic value estimates: the 
accounting prices of domestic resources and the accounting exchange rate to be 
used to convert these prices to units of international currency. 
The previous equation gives a pure number that is the border price value 
of the resources in their (weighted) average alternative use per unit of the 
resources of border price value in their present use. If the number is> l, 
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it tells us that the resources would be put to better use in an alternative 
way. If it is < 1 it tells us that this is a relatively solid use of re-
sources. 
The Comparative Advantage Coefficient 
The Comparative Advantage Coefficient (CV) is the ratio between a given 
DRC and the exchange rate which is regarded as a proper measure of the 
equilibrium ratio between the non-tradeable and tradeable components of the 
economy. If CV turns out to be larger than one it signifies that the activity 
studied requires more resources to generate (or save) one unit of foreign 
exchange than the average productive activity in the economy. If CV is below 
one it indicates that the activity can produce (or save) foreign exchange more 
efficiently than the average productive activity in the economy. 
Source of Data 
The focus of this study is on raw fluid milk, the most important product 
of the Dominican dairy sector. Powdered milk, cheese and butter are left out 
because of data limitations. 
This research required personal interviews with people such as: 
livestock farmers, retailers, farmers' associations and consumers involved in 
the whole dairy sector. It also required the us~ of published data from 
current sources such as the FAO Production Yearbook. Production levels, 
imports and exports were obtained from bulletins such as El Boletin de Cuentas 
Nacionales del Banco Central and government reports on imports of agricul-
tural products. Production cost data was obtained from a 1977 study realized 
by the Asociacion de Productores de Leche(APROLECHE). Using this data, the 
economic effects of milk price policies in the Dominican Republic will be 
estimated for four selected groups of farms located in the Central and North 
regions for the year 1977. 
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Effective Protection Coefficients are obtained deriving value added 
which is the value of the output at any point in the production distribution 
process during the period under consideration less the value of purchased 
inputs in the same period, less depreciation estimated. Since value added is 
a residual concept, what is purchased and its value added will vary according 
to the time period being considered. 
Domestic resource cost is calculated through data mentioned before in 
formula No. 3 (border prices, domestic prices, and inputs used in the pro-
duction process). However, inputs here refer to non-tradeable inputs 
(capital, land and labor). From farm budgets it is possible to calculate the 
cost of each factor discounting the depreciation costs. 
Results 
It is well known that governments intervene in agricultural prices in 
many ways and for assorted reasons. For example, product price supports in 
high income countries maintain farm incomes and often lead to surpluses which 
in turn are exported to developing country markets on concessionary terms, 
further depressing domestic farm prices in the importing countries. Inter-
vention also occurs in the form of agricultural inputs being subsidized or 
taxed. The magnitude of the effects of these policies on Dominican milk 
production, income distribution between producers and consumers or even rural 
employment has not been fully investigated. 
Similarly, government intervention also results from the desire to 
achieve internal price stability. Policymakers often insulate domestic. prices 
from unstable world market prices by establishing stabilization authorities 
such as INESPRE. These institutions are often given monopoly power over 
imports of some price-controlled goods, which have been used not onlv for 
pricP stahilization hut for obtaininR ROVernment revenues. 
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There are three wavs in which governments can intervene to alter market 
incentives for milk production or agricultural production in general: (1) 
Government economic poliries that are net1tral with respect to the opportunity 
cost of agricultural production, (2) policies where agricultural production is 
overvalued and (3) policies where agricultural production is undervalued. The 
first classification is met for very few countries while many developing 
countries such as the Dominican Republic fall in the third category where 
price controls often undervalue agricultural output resulting in under-
production. 
~ominal Pr?tection Co~ff!~ient (NPC) 
The NPC provides a measure of the disparities between domestic market 
prices and international prices using a ratio of the domestic price actually 
received bv producers (pn) and the border price for the same product (Pb) 
converted at the official exchange rate. Any departure of the NPC from one 
estimates the subsidy or tax implicitly given to (levied against) the product 
as a consequence of government intervention. 
Ideally, to estimate NPCs one should have cross-sectional and time 
series data to calculate NPCs for different farms and time periods. Due to 
data limitations, such calculations cannot be performed; however, the NPCs are 
estimated in two ways. 
1) The NPCs are estimated bv farm size and region for the 
year 1977. This method allows the identification of any 
difference in the effect of market distortions on farms 
of different size and on dairy operators in various 
regions. 
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(2 For the years 1977 to 1979, in which only the national 
price of raw milk was available, the NPCs are calculated 
as estimates of market distortions for the average 
producer in the country. 
For the farm size analysis, the domestic price of milk was obtained from 
a production cost study realized by the Asociacion de Productores de Leche 
(APROLECHE) in 1977. This study was used because of the comprehensive data 
base available for the 33 surveyed dairy farms. These farms are located in 
two main milk producing regions of the country (Central and North) and are 
classified according to their production level (Table 2). The APROLECHE study 
was compared with another production cost study carried out by Grullon and 
Romero in 1980. The objective for making this comparison was to determine the 
accuracy of the information given in the APROLECHE study since this in-
stitution represents a producers group who might inflate costs to obtain a 
price increase. However, the comparison showed that both studies found 
similar unitary costs to produce a quart of raw milk. In fact, for those 
small farms producing less than 500 quarts of milk per day APROLECHE estimated 
a unitary cost of RD$0.31. For the same sized farm Grullon and Romero 
computed a unitary cost of RD$0.32. For large farms producing more than 1200 
quarts of milk per day APROLECHE obtained a unitary cost of RD$0.22 and 
Grullon and Romero obtained a unitary cost of RD$0.18. Both studies arrived 
at the conclusion that costs tend to decrease as the size of farm increases. 
The APROLECHE study was also selected instead of the Grullon and R,)mero study 
because the former gives more detailed information about fixed and variable 
costs. This data is required to compute the EPC and DRC coeffficients. 
Also, the APROLECHE study gives more information in terms of Location and size 
of dairy farms. It ts important to point out that although both studies 
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arrive at similar unitary costs, the fact that the APROLECHE study was done 
for 1977 while the Grullon and Romero study was completed in 1980 indicates 
that the production costs of the APROLECHE study could be inflated. 
Border prices were obtained from a time series of average U.S. milk 
prices that reflected how much the Dominican Republic would pay for raw milk 
if it were purchased from the United States. The costs of freight, insurance 
and other transportation costs are aggregated to the FOB prices to obtain 
border prices (CIF). 
The results shown in Table 3 indicate that milk has been subject to a 
variable and sizeable "tax" on the four groups of farms studied. It is 
important to highlight that the term tax here is not defined in accounting 
terms but as a measure of discrimination through government intervention in 
the market. All the NPCs are below one for the four groups of farms, indi-
eating that milk production has been heavily taxed. 
It can be observed that large farms in the Central region have an NPC of 
0.59 or a tax of 41 percent. The reason for this is that producers in this 
region receive a lower milk price than those located in the Northern 
region.5 Furthermore, they face different consumers. In fact, consumers of 
the Central region (which includes the capital and other imporLant cities) are 
more aware of milk quality than the consumers of the Northern region. Almost 
all milk consumed in the capital is pasteurized milk. The preferences of 
urban consumers force producers to sell their raw milk to the pasteurizer 
plants. 
5 Although the price of raw milk should be the same for all 
demand for raw milk in urban centers may lower its price. 
regions, the low 
• 
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Results are similar for the North region. Large farms have an NPC of 
0.68 signifying a tax of 32 percent. However, it is important to point out 
that consumers of this region come mainly from rural areas and consume raw 
milk rather than processed milk. This allows producers to sell milk directly 
to consumers, most of the time at a higher price than processors pay. Also 
these producers have the advantage of being located on the best land in the 
country. Small farms in this region presented a higher tax (NPC of 0.60 and 
consequently a tax of 40 percent) than large farms. 
When NPCs are calculated from the time series data, the results are 
quite similar. For all three years studied, the NPC is significantly below 
one, indicating that milk production was taxed throughout the whole country 
with a level of tax being around 40 percent for 1977-79 (Table 4). 
After analyzing the NPC results for raw milk, a second output alter-
native was computed using whole milk powder. The objective of this al-
ternative is to compare the NPC of reconstituted powdered milk with the NPC 
for raw fluid milk in order to test for possible bias in the border price 
estimating procedure for raw fluid milk. Since powdered milk and fluid milk 
are measured in different units, a conversion factor was used to reconstitute 
a pound of powdered milk to a quart of fluid milk.6 Domestic powdered milk 
prices were obtained from the CODAL balance sheet, due to the fact that CODAL 
is the only dairy firm producing powdered milk in the Dominican Republic. 
Powdered milk border prices were taken from the U.S. dairy market statistics. 
NPC results for whole milk powder are given in Table 5. For the three 
years studied, the NPCs were below one, similar to the NPC results obtained 
for raw milk which implies that powdered milk is also a taxed output. For 
6 To make one pound of whole milk powder, 7.34 pounds of whole milk is re-
quired. A more detailed description of the methodoloRY used to reconstitute 
powdered milk to fluid milk is given in Ortiz dP Oomin~uez. 
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1977 the NPC for powdered milk was 0.59, or a tax of 41 percent; for 1978 the 
tax increased to 46 perc~nt although it decreased to 41 percent in 1979. 
Since the estimated NPCs for raw milk and powdered milk are about the same, 
the border price estimating procedure for raw milk does not appear to be 
unreasonable. 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) 
Since the NPC merely expresses the effect of price intervention on the 
price of milk, it is a partial measure that does not take into account the 
effects of intervention on input markets. The EPC, on the other hand, 
provides a fuller measure of the impact of market distortions on the incentive 
and disincentive offered to milk producers relative to those in the rest of 
the economy. The EPC is designed to capture the net effect of government 
intervention on output and input markets. As the EPC requires the estimation 
of a farm budget in order to define input/output relationships, it is more 
difficult to compute than the NPC. Value added rather than prices are used to 
compute effective protection rates.7 
The EPC is computed for different farm sizes permitting one to appre-
ciate the different farming systems. From the farm budgets defined in the 
APROLECHE study it was possible to derive the average cost of the mair. inputs 
used in the production of raw milk. The cost of inputs at domestic prices was 
taken directly from those farm budgets. Border prices were derived on the 
basis of the CIF price of each component. It is important to point out that 
small farms make extensive use of molasses which is a highly subsidized input 
for milk producers. For instance, a gallon of molasses is sold to cattle 
7 Value added is defined as the value of the output at any point in the 
production-distribution process of any period, less the value of the 
purchased inputs in the same period. 
• 
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raisers by the government through the Consejo Estatal del Azucar (CEA) for 
five cents while in the industrial market the price is 29 cents . 
The EPC results for the four groups of farms studied need to be read as 
a reasonable approximation to the economic conditions prevailing in the milk 
producing sector (Tables 6 to 9). The largest level of discrimination (tax) 
was found in the group of large farms located in the Central and North 
regions. The EPC of large farms of the central region was 0.60 which means 
that the government market intervention has prevented producers from receiving 
the full benefits of their activities. The implicit tax losses for producers 
caused by marketing intervention is about 40 percent. For the same size of 
farm in the North region, this "tax" is only 9 percent. The difference in the 
effect of regulations on these two regions can be explained in part by the 
natural advantages (better land and natural conditions) and by the price 
received ~y each farm. The value added of farms in the North is significantly 
higher than the value added of farms in the Central region. This implies that 
the factors of production (land, labor and capital) are better paid in the 
North region than in the Central region. In fact, small farms located in the 
North region have an EPC of 1.17 implying that milk production in this region 
has been protected. 
The last case to analyze are the small farms situated in the Central 
region for which a negative EPC was obtained (-0.42). This signifies that 
these farms have suffered an absolute loss of foreign exchange. These farms 
depend heavily on concentrate and molasses for feeding cows, since the pasture 
produced on the amount of land producers own is small.8 
8 Production costs used for the EPC show that producers are spending their monev 
mainly on concentrates, molasses and equipment. If the prices of these inputs 
increase, the value added also will increase and the results would be a lower 
EPC. Consequently, the subsidy required to get the same income will be 
greater. 
• 
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In general terms. the EPC results suggest that price intervention in 
milk production is considerable for the four groups of farms analyzed. The 
results also demonstrate that large producers are taxed more than small ones. 
except those located in the Central region. The extensive use of the highly 
subsidized input (molasses) has allowed small farms in the North to be less 
affected by the restrictions on the price of the final product.9 
On the other hand, the importance of intermediate inputs in milk 
production is illustrated by the considerable difference between the NPC and 
EPC average values: The NPC estimates are above 0.60 and EPC below 0.60. 
This implies that milk producers are negatively affected by government 
interventions not only on the output market but also in input markets. 
The negative effect of government intervention has caused a lower level 
of milk production, which seems to be contrary to the explicit interventions 
for controlling the market. The good intentions of protecting the consumer of 
milk from high prices is creating a problem that was supposed to be solved. 
When the price of milk is kept low, consumers are prevented from getting their 
demand satisfied at the regulated price. The market intervention policy 
should be revised; the situation calls for a more liberal policy in order to 
reduce the tax. 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) 
The economic incentives discussed previously (NPCs and EPCs) measured 
the extent of the tax or subsidy to which milk production is subject as a 
result of government intervention in price. The DRC. in fact, tells us how 
9 This should be taken with skepticism. There are some doubts that all 
molasses bought by milk producers have been used in milk production. A 
"black market'' for molasses may have evolved between milk producers and rum 
producers, for instance. 
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much the nontradeable factors of production (land, labor and capital mainly) 
have been paid, above or below their opportunity cost. Nevertheless the EPC, 
by its nature, cannot give any information on the advisability, of promoting 
or taxing the activity analyzed in the whole economy. In order to answer this 
question it is necessary to examine the real cost of production to the 
domestic economy of the milk production. This task is accomplished by using 
the coefficient denominated: Domestic Resource Cost (DRC). The DRC is a ratio 
between the cost of dollars earned or saved through domestic production and an 
accounting rate of exchange. In general, the computation of DRC involves two 
basic estimates of values: 1) the accounting prices of domestic resources and 
2) the accounting exchange rate to be used to convert these prices into units 
of international currency. 
The definition of the DRC suffers from the problem of defining which 
resources are domestic and which are foreign. A more important point is the 
dichotomy existing between traded and non-traded resources in the valuation of 
inputs and outputs. The DRC can be computed by several formulas.IO The one 
used in this study was defined earlier. The DRC derived here has to be read 
as an approximation of the ideal formula. Basic data to compute DRC co-
efficients comes from the farm budget information used in NPC and EPC es-
timation. In this particular case the analysis is focused on the social 
convenience of milk production. The derivation of the DRC is approached in 
two ways. The first considers the situation given the official exchange rate 
of RD$1.00 = US$1.00 while the second considers the situation at the pre-
vailing open market exchange rate. The reason for calculating the second DRC 
10 For more information about the DRC derivation formula, see reference I LSI, 
pp. 17-20. 
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is to observe the local cost of resources if these inputs were purchased at 
the exchange rate of the parallel market. 
The Compar~ive Advantage Coefficient (CV) 
The CV is the ratio between a given DRC and an exchange rate which is 
regarded as a proper measure of the equilibrium rate between the nontradeable 
and tradeable components of the economies. The (CV) calculation permits us 
to explore the social convenience of milk production by expressing the DRC's 
in terms of "comparative advantage" (CV). 
Tables 10 to 13 show the results obtained for the DRC in the four groups 
of farms. For large farms in the Central and North regions, the value of the 
DRC was significantly below one (0.39 and 0.88, respectively). Given the fact 
that milk has been considered as an importable good, obtaining a DRC below one 
demonstrates the advisability of stimulating milk production. Moreover, when 
the situation is considered at the official exchange rate, the value taken by 
the DRC is the same as the one of comparative advantage (CV = DRC/Exchange 
rate= CV= DRC/1 = DRC). This implies that for large farms the CV is below 
one, indicating a comparative advantage in milk production for those farms; 
the lower the CV the higher the comparative advantage (Table 14). By 
promoting milk production on large farms, policymakers would be promoting 
savings of foreign exchange in an efficient way. 
The situation, however, is quite different when one considers farms of 
small size. It turns out, these farms are inefficient because they require 
more resources to save one unit of foreign exchange than the average activity 
in the economy. As was indicated earlier in this chapter, the small farms of 
the Central region presented a negative value added at border prices signi-
fying a net transfer of foreign exchange from the Dominican Republic to the 
rest of the world. For the small farms of the North region the DRC was found 
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to be 2.18 which indicates that those farms show a certain inefficiency, being 
highly subsidized by the government through molasses sales which were well 
below the world market price. Thus, the values of the DRC indicate a com-
parative disadvantage for smaller sized farms. The Dominican Republic will be 
better off stimulating those farms to reallocate resources to a more profit-
able alternative rather than subsidizing their inefficient milk production. 
DRC and CV results indicate that the Dominican Republic has a com-
parative advantage in producing milk on large farms and consequently it would 
be advisable to stimulate milk production on them. 
Use of the market exchange rate rather than the official exchange rate 
does not change the analysis. Since the market exchange rate has been above 
the official rate since 1960, the CV coefficient will be lower than previous 
estimates. This implies that when using the market exchange rate, the 
Dominican Republic has a more favorable comparative advantage in stimulating 
milk production on large farms. In the case of small farms it is still 
disadvantageous but lower in magnitude than at the official exchange rate (See 
Table 13). In other words, the comparative advantage of milk production would 
increase if the government eliminated the overvaluation of the domestic 
currency. 
Conclusions 
Domestic milk production has failed to keep pace with the domestic 
demand and because of this the imports of milk have increased. The SEA 
estimated that during the early 1970s approximately 20 per.cent of total milk 
consumed was imported. Trends for the remainder of the decade indicate that 
this percentage is going to be increasing (16). 
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Import targets for milk are set to reduce imports, based upon expected 
domestic supplies. Nevertheless, the level of these imports has depended upon 
the obiectives of different policymakers. 
The main objective of the study reported herein was to identify and 
analyze the major incentives and disincentives affecting the dairy sector, 
particularly for fluid raw milk. Three basic coefficients were used to 
quantify the effects of government intervention in milk production: the 
Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), the Effective Protection Coefficient 
(EPC) and the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC). In order to analyze the com-
parative advantage for fluid raw milk, a fourth coefficient, the Comparative 
Advantage Coefficient (CV), was computed. 
The analysis presented shows that price intervention in milk production 
has been substantial. As a consequence of this the return to primary factors 
of production (land, labor and capital) has been well below their opportunity 
costs. An implicit tax on the dairy industry was shown through the cal-
culation of two coefficients, NPC and EPC. The NPC estimation had a dis-
crimination above 40 percent, and EPC presented a discrimination below 40 
percent. This implies that milk producers are negatively affected by gov-
ernment intervention not only on the output market but also in the input 
markets. The problem is more critical for large farms. 
DRC and CV coefficients indicate a comparative advantage in milk 
production for large farms. However, a comparative disadvantage was obtained 
for small farms. While an important share of the sector's problem arises from 
economic policies aimed at serving objectives that are largely inconsistent 
with the milk production growth, all this has caused a growing discomfort over 
the sector's failure to live up to its acknowledged potential for greatly 
enhanced production. 
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The extent of price intervention in milk production has been substantial 
Government market intervention has introduced distortions in the milk sector 
that have had adverse effects upon the efficiency of milk production, trade, 
investments, resource use and upon income distribution. The objective of this 
intervention has been to achieve internal price stability, adequate supplies 
and low consumer prices. As a result of the present pricing policy the 
government has been discouraging efficient milk producers and protecting the 
inefficient ones. 
Milk production is discouraged while consumption is subsidized 
The explicit objectives of increasing farm income and increasing 
consumer welfare have not been met. Moreover, estimates of the NPC co-
efficient demonstrate that public policy is discouraging domestic milk 
production. For the four groups of farms studied NPC's values were sig-
nificantly below one (0.59, 0.56, 0.68, 0.60, respectively)_. This shows that 
milk production is taxed at a rate near 40 percent. When NPC's were cal-
culated from the time series data, results were quite similar. The EPC 
results demonstrate that price intervention in input markets was also con-
siderable. Large producers were more heavily taxed than were small ones, 
except in the Central region. Intervention in input markets has apparently 
had a slightly negative effect on the returns to factors of production, a 
finding which contradicts the widespread belief that input subsidizing 
compensates, at least partially, the effects of discriminating milk price 
policies. The negative effect of government intervention has been reflected 
in a low level of production, which seems to be contrary to the explicit 
purpose for controlling the market. 
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The Dominican Republic has a __ comparat_:!._ye ~dvantage in producing milk on larg~ 
farms. These results tell us that the country could profitably allocate 
resources to produce milk on its largest and most efficient farms. However, 
there is a disadvantage in the case of small farms and policymakers should 
not encourage milk production on these farms. Small producers should be 
grouped into cooperatives in order to increase their efficiency. 
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Table 1: Milk Production, Consumption and Imports, Dominican 
Republic (1970-85) (Millions of Liters) 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Production 
223 
248 
251 
252 
303 
263 
284 
247 
278 
289 
297 
305 
313 
Projectionsb/ 
321 
329 
338 
Consumption 
248 
259 
266 
274 
282 
291 
299 
308 
317 
327 
336 
350 
361 
372 
383 
396 
Imports.~/ 
65 
70 
39 
26 
21 
22 
40 
42 
59 
65 
72 
80 
88 
98 
108 
120 
~IA conversion factor of 1 kilogram equals 9.46 liters was used to 
transform imported powdered milk to fluid milk. 
Q/Projections were made holding the per capita fresh milk 
consumption constant (80.9 liters for 1980) and multiplying it for the 
projections of population carried out for la Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas 
(ONE). 
Source: Gruillon, D. and H. Romero, "Diagnostico de Subsector Ganadero. 
Evolucion de la Industria Lechera y su Incidencia en la 
Economia Dominicana (1970-80)," Thesis submitted to Economics 
Department, Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo (UASD), 1981, 
p. 15-122. 
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Table 2: Milk Production by Land Area Used and by Farm Size, 
Dominican Republic 1977 
Region/Size 
Area Used 
(tareas) 
Production/Year 
(1000 quarts) 
Production/tarea 
/year/1000 quarts 
Central 
Large Farms~/ 
Small Farms~./ 
North 
Large Farms~/ 
Small Farms~/ 
~/Produce more than 
~/Produce less than 
~/Produce more than 
~/Produce less than 
3,420 
614 
3, 283 
706 
700,000 quarts 
155,000 quarts 
700,000 quarts 
126,000 quarts 
of 
of 
of 
of 
708 
154 
712 
125 
milk/year. 
milk/year. 
milk/year. 
milk/year. 
57 
69 
49 
59 
Source: APROLECHE. Comportamiento y Situacion del subsector Produccion 
leche en La Republica Dominicana, 1979, P· 43. 
Table 3: NPC for Raw Milk in Central and North Regions, 
Dominican Republic, 1977 
Region/Size 
Central 
Large Farms 
Small Farms 
North 
Large Farms 
Small Farms 
Domestic Prices 
(RD$10,000 qts.) 
2,352 
2,258 
2' 710 
2,384 
Source: Author's estimates. 
Border Prices 
(RD$/10,000 qts.) 
3, 964 
3,964 
3,964 
3, 964 
Selected data. 
NPC 
0. 59 
0.56 
0.68 
0.60 
de 
• 
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Table 4: NPC for Raw Milk, Dominican Republic, 1977-79 
------ ----- -----· -- -----·--------- ---------- ----- ---- ----- ----· ·--- --------------·--· --------- ---------------------------·---
Years 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Domestic Prices 
(RD$/10,000 qts.) 
237 
237 
281 
Source: Author's estimates 
Border Prices 
(RD$/10,000 qts.) 
396 
419 
457 
NPC 
0.60 
0.57 
0.61 
Table 5: NPC for Whole Milk Powder, Dominican Republic (1977-1979) 
·-------------------------------
Years 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Domestic Prices 
(RD$/10,000 qts.) 
1560 
1560 
1936 
Source: Author's estimates 
Border Prices 
(RD$/10,000 qts.) 
2639 
2860 
3206 
NPC 
0.59 
0.54 
0.60 
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Table 6: EPC for Raw Milk on Large Farms of Cer.x:.-al Region, 
Dominican Republic, 1977~/ (RD$/10,000 quart~) 
Number of Farms: 7 
Item (Input j) Ai·P·d J ] A· .p.b 1] ] 
Equipment 101 172 
Concentrate 790 1,079 
Mineral & Salt 11 19 
Molasses 69 570 
Veterinary & Medicine 113 192 
Fertilizer 143 119 
Herbicide 16 19 
Fuel 48 23 
Utilities 40 68 
a) Total Value Inputs/10,000 quarts 1. 331 2,261 
b) Gross Income/10,000 quarts 2,352 3, 964 
c) Value Added per 10,000 quarts (b-a) 1,021 1,703 
d) EPC = 1021 . 1703 • 0.60 
~/Large farms produce more than 700,000 quarts of milk/year. 
Source: Author's estimates, using the farm budget realjzed bv APROLECHE 
jn 1977. 
.. 
' 
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Table 7: EPC for Raw Milk on Small Farms of Central Region, 
Dominican Republic, 1977~/ (RD$/10,000 quarts) 
------------------------------------------------------
Number of Farms: 2 
--·--·--------------------------------------------------
Item (Input j) 
Equipment 201 615 
Concentrate 387 529 
Mineral & Salt 24 73 
Molasses 343 2,837 
Veterinary & Medicine 228 698 
Fertilizer 330 276 
Herbicide 16 19 
Fuel 142 67 
Utilities 38 116 
a) Total Value Inputs/10,000 quarts 1,709 5, 230 
b) Gross Income/10,000 quarts 2,238 3, 964 
c) Value Added per 10,000 quarts (b-a) 529 -1,266 
d) EPC = 529 ~ 1266 = -0.42 
!!small farms produce less than 155,JOO quarts of milk/year. 
Source: Author's estimates, using the farm budget realized by APROLECHE 
in 1977. 
• 
" 
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Table 8: EPC for Raw Milk on Large Farms of North Region 
Dominican Republic, 1977~/ (RD$/10,000 qua;ts) 
Number of Farms: 5 
Item (Input j) 
Equipment 140 
Concentrate 834 
Mineral & Salt 26 
Molasses 88 
Veterinary & Medicine 180 
Fertilizer 1 72 
Herbicide. 24 
Fuel 95 
Utilities 29 
a) Total Value Inputs/10,000 quarts l, 588 
b) Gross Income/10,000 quarts 2 I 710 
c) Value Added per 10,000 quarts (b-a) 1, 122 
d) EPC = 1122 . 1232 = 0.91 
A· .p.b 
l] J 
--------------
241 
1I140 
45 
728 
310 
144 
46 
28 
50 
2,732 
3, 964 
1. 2 32 
~/Large farms produce more than 700,000 quarts of milk/year. 
Source: Author's estimates, using the farm budget realized by APROLECHE 
in 1977. 
,, 
.. 
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Table 9: EPC for Raw Milk on Small Farms of North Region, 
Dominican Republic, 1977~/ (RD$/10,000 qua~ts) 
Item (Input j) 
Equipment 177 
Concentrate 842 
Mineral & Salt 35 
Molasses 144 
Veterinary & Medicine 166 
Fertilizer 150 
Herbicide 5 
Fuel 102 
Utilities 15 
a) Total Value Inputs/10,000 quarts l, 636 
b) Gross Income/10,000 quarts 2,384 
c) Value Added per 10,000 quarts (b-a) 748 
359 
l, 150 
71 
1, 191 
337 
125 
9 
49 
31 
3,322 
3,964 
642 
----------------------
d) EPC = 7~8 f 642 = 1.17 
~/small farms produce less than 126,000 quarts of milk/year. 
Source: Author's estimates, using the farm budget realized by APROLECHE 
in 1977. 
• 
- \ 
.. 
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Table 10: DRC: Cost of Non-Tradeable Inputs for Raw Milk, Large Farms, 
Central Region, Dominican Republic, 1977 
Item 
($/10,000 quarts) 
1. Labor 
2. Land 
3. Capital 
4. Pasture 
TOTAL 
DRC == 665 1703.~/ = 0. 39 
~/The denominator of EPC 
Source: Author's estimates 
Cost 
261 
264 
133 
7 
665 
Table 11: DRC: Cost of Non-Tradeable Inputs for Raw Milk, Small Farms, 
Central Region, Dominican Republic, 1977 
Item 
($/10,000 quarts) Cost 
1. Labor 
2. Land 
3. Capital 
4. Pasture 
TOTAL 
DRC = 853 . 12566~/ = -0.67 
~/The denominator of EPC 
Source: Author's estimates 
Cost 
402 
434 
10 
7 
853 
• 
-\ 
. 
• 
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Table 12: DRC: Cost of Non-Tradeahle Inputs for Raw Milk, Large Farms, 
North Region, Dominican Republic, 1977 
Item 
($/10,000 quarts) 
1. Labor 
2. Land 
3. Capital 
4. Pasture 
Cost 
385 
434 
147 
117 
TOTAL 1033 
DRC = 1088 . 1232~/ = 0.88 
~/The denominator of EPC 
Source: Author's estimates 
Table 13: DRC: Cost of Non-Tradeable Inputs for Raw Milk, Small Farms, 
North Region, Dominican Republic, 1977 
Item 
($/10,000 quarts) 
I. .Labor 
2. Land 
3. Capital 
4. Pasture 
Cost 
516 
610 
268 
6 
TOTAL 1400 
DRC = 1400 . 642~/ = 2.18 
~/The denominator of EPC 
Source: Author's estimates 
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Table 14: Comparative Advantage Coefficient (CV) for Raw Milk, Central 
and North Regions, Dominican Republic, 1977 
Size/Region DRC 
(1) 
Large Farms 
Central Region 0.39 
North Region 0.88 
Small 
Central Region -0.67 
North Region 2 .18 
~v 
(Official 
Exchange Rate) 
(2) 
0. 39 
0.88 
-0.67 
2.18 
CV 
(Market 
Exchange Rate)~/ 
(3) 
0.32 
o. 72 
-0.55 
1. 79 
~/The market exchange rate for 1977 was 22 percent above the official 
exchange rate. 
Source: Author's estimates 
